greater significance after World War II, as US government officials created a more central and aggressive role for organized labor in foreign policy. Organized labor's more active participation in foreign policy matters coincided with the Mexican state's drive toward industrialization and the US government's deeper involvement in the Mexican economy.
2 As Mexican presidents Manuel Avila Camacho (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) and Miguel Aleman (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) sought to abandon the radical nationalism of the Lazaro Cardenas era (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) and attract foreign resources rather than expropriate or regulate them, a conservative shift in state labor policy developed. The state's commitment to a rapid program of industrialization resulted in restricting labor opposition to its policies, holding down wages, suppressing the right to strike and greater control over trade unions and their leaders. 3 Acting as instruments of US foreign policy, American labor leaders played key roles in helping the Mexican government carry out these policies. The outbreak of the Cold War facilitated their efforts, as anticommunism served as a powerful ideological weapon in the campaign against labor militancy. For US officials and American trade union leaders, the taming of the Mexican labor movement was part of a global effort to undermine leftist-leaning unions. Through the Organization Regional Intra-Americana de Trabajadores (ORIT) and the US Embassy, American trade unionists provided cooperating Mexican labor leaders with logistical and financial support to neutralize forces within Mexico's working-class movement that opposed state development and labor policy. This strategy included undermining the influence of Vicente Lombardo Toledano and the Confederation de Trabajadores de America Latina (CTAL) and facilitating the imposition and entrenchment of so-called charros (government-controlled labor leaders who relied on force to maintain themselves in power).
The period beginning with the closing months of World War II and lasting until 1954, laid the foundations of US labor policy toward Mexico, which continued throughout the remainder of the decade and on into the 1960s. These cornerstones included isolating and ousting communist trade union officials from leadership posts as well as blunting the influence of economic nationalists within the Mexican working-class movement. This practice involved an intensive information program directed at "Americanizing" the trade union culture of Mexico. The distribution of films, and Norman Caulfield, "Wobblies and Mexican Workers in Mining and Petroleum, 1905-1924" , International Review of Social History, 40 (1995), pp. 51-76. 2 For a discussion of the increased managerial role of the US government in the Mexican economy, see Stephen R. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development: The United States and Mexico, 1938 -1954 (Wilmington, DE, 1995 Kevin J. Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution (Baltimore, 1995) , p. 160. Also see Viviane Brachet-Marquez, The Dynamics of Domination (Pittsburgh and London, 1994) , pp. 8 3 -i l l , for an overview of the state's conservative shift in labor policy. books, newspapers, news bulletins, and the subsidization of Mexico's largest labor federation, the Confederation de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM) were part of an attempt to implant among Mexican workers an idealized version of the trade union movement in the United States. The promotion of collective bargaining, the sending of Mexican trade unionists to the United States to study English, US history, labor economics and statistics, all helped to create an institutional structure compatible with US interests.
Both the AFL and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) backed US trade and economic measures toward Latin America. Their leaders viewed unrestricted trade, minimal state economic intervention and private sector development as ingredients necessary for economic expansion, which they believed would result in a higher standard of living for the Mexican people. The result would be more purchasing power for Mexicans, who in turn would buy more goods manufactured by American workers. These ideas were the same as those of Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL during the Mexican Revolution. In the early Cold War years, the US trade union leadership continued Gompers' labor internationalism by forging a stronger partnership with corporations and government officials in the expansion of American economic interests and the eradication of radical unionism abroad. The result was the US labor movement's alliance with trade union leaders in foreign countries who collaborated with modernizing elites. 4 Since the 1960s scholars of the Latin American labor scene have increasingly turned their attention to the relationships among unions, the state and foreign powers. 5 The ongoing transformation of the global economy has highlighted the importance of this complex set of relation-4 Gompers' labor internationalism and its ties to US economic hegemony in Latin America Rank-and-File", Science and Society, 56 (1993), pp. 421-439; and Cliff Welch, "Labor Internationalism: U.S. Involvement in Brazilian Unions, 1945 -1965 ", Latin American Research Review, 30 (1995 . In addition to these works, Ian Roxborough's essay "Labor Control and the Postwar Growth Model in Latin America", in David Rock (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s: War and Post-War Transitions (Berkeley [etc.], 1994) , contextualizes the efforts of Latin America's modernizing elites to harness labor militancy within economic development strategies that increasingly relied on foreign capital. This theme is expanded upon in Jon V. Kofas, The Struggle for Legitimacy: Latin American Labor and the United States, 1930 -1960 (Tempe, AZ, 1992 . More specifically, Kofas focuses on the labor dimension of the Cold War, and relies heavily upon US State Department records to document the formation of ORIT and the AFL-State Department's anti-CTAL campaign.
ships. However, recent studies of the Mexican labor movement, which include coverage of the early years of the Cold War, have focused primarily on the internal dynamics of trade unions and their relationships with the state and political parties while ignoring the dimension of labor internationalism.
6
By examining the process of labor internationalism during the early Cold War years, this study hopes to fill a gap in understanding a crucial period in the history of the Mexican labor movement. Central to this objective is discussion of how US government, ORTT and AFL money and assistance consolidated the position of charros in important national unions. What follows is an attempt to link issues such as the fragility of the CTM during the 1940s, the erosion of Lombardo's power, the mechanics of the charrazos in 1947-1951 and, especially, the role played by the American government and organized labor from the United States in the yost-charrazo consolidation, a poorly understood episode in Mexican labor history.
BACKGROUND: THE MEXICAN STATE AND LABOR DURING WORLD WAR II
Mexico's entry into World War II sharpened already existing divisions within the Mexican labor movement, as the state committed to rapid industrialization through foreign investment and a political program of national unity. The pro-labor policies and the intense political conflict that characterized the Lazaro Cardenas era ended. In its place, the administrations of Avila Camacho and Miguel Aleman promoted worker-employer collaboration. To enforce cooperation, the state amended federal labor laws that restricted the right to strike and imposed harsh penalties on strikers, which stipulated long jail sentences for anyone attempting to "dissolve" society through strikes in industries of "great social importance".
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This policy paralleled the emergence of a new industrial elite which worked in close association with the government to formulate policies. War contracts, tax breaks, falling wages and monetary favors created a symbiotic relationship between the state and industrial elites, all within 6 Although Brachet-Marquez, The Dynamics of Domination and Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution offer keen insight and detail of Mexican trade union politics during the early years of the Cold War, they both fail to address the issue of labor internationalism, which included the interventionist role of ORIT, the AFL, the CIO and the impact these forces had upon the Mexican working-class movement historically as well as within a contemporary context. Mexican scholars of the labor movement generally fall into the same category. While the essays in Victor Manuel Durand Ponte (ed.), Las derrotas obreras, 1946 -1952 (Mexico City, 1984 , analyze leftist setbacks and defeats in the petroleum, railroad and mining unions during the Aleman sexenio, they fail to link this dynamic to Lourdes Quintanilla's study, Lomabardismo y sindicatos en america lat'ma (Mexico City, 1982 Mexico, 1939 -1975 (Mexico City, 1988 14 Lombardo replied that "dissident elements" were trying to destroy "national unity". He added that they served the interests of foreign governments that attempted to disrupt Mexico's plan for national development.
15
While Lombardo, the CTAL and the CTM's principal leaders adhered to this policy, dissension within its ranks continued to grow. At the CTM's January 1945 annual convention, an opposition group emerged. Ivan Jose Rivera Rojas led the Bloque Revindicador de la CTM (Revindication Bloc of the CTM) and denounced the CTM's leadership as "government stooges" and "traitors to the working class". 16 Despite widespread rankand-file dissatisfaction with its policy, CTM leaders and Lombardo's CTAL sought closer cooperation with the state and continued the no-strike pledge. Accordingly, they agreed to renew the war-time "patriotic alliance for the nation's independence" through a Labor-Industry Pact.
17 Lombardo, the CTAL and CTM leaders stressed the "necessity for a complete and lasting agreement between labor, capital, and management". They endorsed the position of Jose R. Colin, president of the National Chamber of Commerce (CONCAMIN) that "help from foreign capital to aid private enterprise was in the best interests of the nation". 18 In September 1945, the CTM and CONCAMIN formed a "Committee to Prevent Strikes", to ensure labor peace and carry out the government and industry's plan for national development.
19
Rank-and-file groups within CTM unions responded by creating organizations called depuradas. These groups sought the "purification" of the CTM by agitating for union democracy and autonomy. 20 The rising dissension within the CTM's ranks paralleled Mexico's increasing economic ties with the United States and the advent of the Cold War, which prompted American government officials and labor leaders to seek greater involvement in Mexican labor affairs. MEXICO, 1917 MEXICO, -1945 The renewed interest of American trade unions in Mexican labor affairs in the post-war era built upon the work begun during the revolutionary period by Samuel Gompers and other AFL leaders. In part, the AFL's response to the Mexican Revolution involved its opposition to radical unionism spawned by the social upheaval. Of particular concern for the AFL was the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), its chief rival in the United States, which had made organizational inroads among Mexican miners working in the borderland regions and northern Mexico. Inside Mexico, the IWW cooperated with labor groups such as the Casa del Obrero Mundial, which advocated workers' control of industry and the overthrow of the state through a general strike.
AMERICAN UNIONS AND ORGANIZED LABOR IN
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In the process of opposing this tendency, Gompers and the AFL supported the Confederation Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), an organization founded in 1918, and which ideologically emulated the AFL. The CROM, like the AFL, promoted the organization of workers around the concept of "business" unionism, which rests upon the acceptance of capitalism and the relations that develop between workers, employers and government as a result. Samuel Gompers described it as "trade unionism pure and simple", a struggle for higher wages and benefits, and excluding the notion that workers form a class with widely shared interests. In 1919, the cooperation between the CROM and the AFL produced the formation of the Pan-American Federation of Labor (PAFL). Although the CROM willingly participated in the PAFL, it did so as a junior partner. The AFL dominated the organization, which openly promoted US economic expansion in the western hemisphere, fulfilling Gompers' call for a "labor corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine.
Working through the CROM and the AFL, the Mexican government successfully suppressed labor radicalism on an organizational level in the 1920s. During the 1930s, however, radical unionism in Mexico experienced a revival with the Cardenas government's expropriation of the foreign-owned oil companies and landholdings. While the AFL opposed the Mexican state's actions, the CIO gave its tacit support for the expropriation decrees. CIO President John L. Lewis followed the Gompers legacy of supporting higher wages in extractive industries to enable.Mexicans to purchase goods manufactured by American workers. At the start of the Cold War, when US business looked increasingly to Mexico and Latin America for new markets, outlets for capital investment and access to raw materials, American trade union leaders fully embraced the ideas of the Gompers legacy. The friction that had characterized the AFL-CIO relationship of the 1930s withered at the end of World War II, as both federa-tions united to support US economic expansion abroad and the establishment of anticommunist unionism.
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The astonishing expansion of the US economy during World War II reinforced the faith held by American trade unionists in the fundamental soundness of the capitalist system. At the war's end, union leaders rallied around the idea that continued United States economic prosperity was related directly to the expansion of trade abroad. CIO official Philip Murray praised the July 1944 Bretton Woods agreement, declaring that it represented the "best guarantee of an expanded world trade that will afford protection to American businessmen, markets to American farmers and jobs for American workers".
23 Jacob S. Potofsky, chairman of the CIO's Latin American Affairs Committee, in 1945 told the Ways and Means Committee of the US House of Representatives: "As we look at the U.S. economy one thing is clear; our country is set up to produce, in several lines, more goods than we ever have consumed here or are likely to". Reinforcing the collaboration was the acceleration of the trend of US economic domination, which resulted from the effects of the war. The United States had displaced Europe as chief exporter and importer in Latin American trading relations. 25 In the immediate post-war years, US investment continued to flow into the extractive industries of the region, with less than 20 per cent going to the development of manufacturers. The investment strategy toward Latin America corresponded with the American trade union movement's long-term policy toward US business expansion in the region. As long as workers south of the border did not take manufacturing jobs from American workers, unions supported government and corporate policy objectives in the western hemisphere. Stanley Ruttenberg, Director of Research and Education for the CIO, confirmed this line of thinking in 1947, stating that "over 3 million jobs in America were dependent on foreign trade". He added "that maintaining foreign markets for our goods and importing vital materials necessary for our industrial production will play an essential part in keeping our industrial potential". 
LOMBARDO, AMERICAN UNIONS AND MEXICAN NATIONALISM
An important component of this policy was opposition against economic nationalism in all of its forms. Both US policymakers and American trade union leaders believed that economic nationalism invited communist penetration. 27 In Mexico the policy translated into attacks against Lombardo and the CTAL. Lombardo's CTAL supported protectionist tariffs and state-directed development of basic industries. Lombardo's strident economic nationalism combined with his openly declared Marxism and control of the CTAL, made him a special target of US government officials and trade union leaders. During the war, US diplomats used their good relationship with Sidney Hillman, then vice-president of the CIO, and, for a time, member of the War Production Board (WPB), to block links that Lombardo was trying to forge with US labor.
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Among the leadership of the AFL and the CIO, only John L. Lewis expressed sympathy for Lombardo's position, which the newspaper El Popular articulated in a running campaign to convince its readers that the former CTM chief headed a coalition of labor and capital to give the nation the best opportunity to industrialize.
29 Lombardo failed to persuade US diplomats in Mexico that he welcomed American capital as an integral part of Mexico's industrialization program. Too many times he had spoken of the "dangers of American capital", which were summarized in his resignation speech before the 1941 CTM Congress when he stated: "If we are to continue to be squeezed by the great Yankee monopolies as one squeezes an orange [...] the price of the peso will be fixed by the producers, merchants, and bankers of the United States."
30
As early as 1943, US diplomats and trade union leaders attempted to neutralize Lombardo and undercut the CTAL's influence in Latin America. Through the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) with Nelson Rockefeller as its coordinator, the US government initiated a policy of financing the extension of union activities into Latin America. The goal was to cultivate elements within the Latin American labor movement that were sympathetic to US interests in the region. This policy became even more urgent when Lombardo and the CTAL led the Mexican opposition to the US Clayton Plan, unveiled at the February 1945 Chapultepec Conference in Mexico City. The Plan promoted lower tariffs for American spheric alternative to the Lombardo-controlled CTAL. 43 On 5 January 1948 the Thirty-third National Council of the CTM met and ratified the expulsion of Lombardo. The Council also passed resolutions that forbade CTM members from belonging to Lombardo's newly-created Popular Party and participating in "incidental" committees protesting the high cost of living in Mexico and the American Clayton Plan. 44 Delegates at the meeting also resolved to suspend relations with the CTAL and the WFTU, as long as Lombardo served as president and vice-president of those organizations. 45 The government then unfolded its charro strategy, which began with the election of Jesus Diaz de Leon as general secretary of the Railroad Workers' union. Immediately upon taking office, Diaz de Leon accused former union head Luis Gomez Z. of having embezzled several hundred thousand pesos from the union's treasury. Before the union could investigate the charges, Diaz de Leon involved the Procuraderia de Justiciadistrict attorney of the Federal District -in the matter. On 14 October 1948 Gomez Z. and several hundred union members met to discuss what they called "the state's involvement in the internal life of the union". Diaz de Leon, leading 100 policemen disguised as railroad workers raided the meeting and arrested Gomez Z., while federal soldiers occupied four other railroad workers' locals in Mexico City. 46 As the railroad workers' union fell to charro leadership, the charrazo campaign gained momentum and became immersed in the politics of labor internationalism.
THE AMERICANS AND CHARRO ENTRENCHMENT
In their campaign against the opposition, state officials and CTM charros enlisted the cooperation and financial support of ORIT, US trade unions and the American government. US trade union activities in Mexico and Latin America escalated as a result of the firm unity reached by the AFL and CIO on foreign policy matters. This facilitated the efforts on behalf of US State Department officials to undercut the influence of the Lombardo-controlled CTAL, which up to this point had received support from the CIO. The AFL-CIO cooperation translated into a firm commitment to advance ORIT in Latin America and sever relations with the CTAL. In a confidential circular to consular offices in Latin America, the US State Department reported on its potential impact surrounding ORIT activities: "CIO participation makes it impossible for the corrimunist-led CTAL to utilize alleged support or sympathies from any important United States 43 With ORTT's support, the CTM organized a "pact of friendship" and "bloc of unity" with other labor federations, which included the charro leaders of miners, petroleum and railroad workers' locals. The participants pledged to fight communist and "subversive" activities within their own unions, and they received official labor status from the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI). 49 To consolidate their ranks, they planned to raid smaller unions and incorporate them into the CTM structure. The financial assistance that the CTM received from the US government-funded ORTT to carry out this strategy was timely. It arrived when the Mexican government had curtailed subsidies to the CTM and all "friendly" labor organizations, most of which relied on state financial support for their existence. However, imposing charrismo on the entire membership of the miners' union presented problems. The union represented workers in different private and state-owned mining companies and metalworking plants throughout Mexico. Within union locals there existed distinct occupational specializations, different contracts, wage and benefit levels, and working conditions. These conditions produced a tradition of strident intraunion rivalries and separatist movements. Accordingly, the excluded delegations, protesting Carrasco's actions, held a rival convention and elected Garcia Moreno as general secretary of the new National Miners' Union. It advocated autonomy, opposition to wage freezes, freedom of political affiliation for its members and solidarity pacts with other industrial unions. The government reacted to the rank-and-file insurgency by notifying employers that Carrasco's union had exclusive bargaining rights. It then used police to break up dissident meetings and cooperated with employers in firing workers who resisted Carrasco's authority.
53
Despite widespread intimidation and repression, the rank and file continued to fight. TTie peak of the resistance occurred during a strike against ASARCO's Nueva Rosita facility that began on 12 June 1950. ASARCO had been a symbol of foreign economic domination since the days of the Revolution, and workers had struck in its mines and smelters on countless occasions. They frequently called for ASARCO's expropriation. In northern Mexico ASARCO controlled powerful subsidiaries, such as Carbonfferas Sabinas and Mexican Zinc. Managers and executives ran the company towns and bribed public officials, including the police and the military.
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The rebel National Miners' Union, which represented 5,800 members of Local No. 14, demanded wage increases, better safety in the mine, more holidays, construction of roads between the mines and local towns, recognition of occupational diseases, housing and a farm to grow food for the miners' families. ASARCO refused to meet the demands and the Committee of Conciliation and Arbitration declared the strike "illegal". Rather than force a confrontation, however, the government urged that ASARCO and the rebel union sign a contract. ASARCO agreed, primarily because the recent outbreak of the Korean War had boosted the price of various metals 60 per cent. Although ASARCO wanted production to continue at Nueva Rosita, nonetheless it was unwilling to abide by the new 32 Basurto, Del avilacamachismo, p. 246. 33 Federico Besserer, Victoria Novelo and Juan Luis Sariego, El sindicalismo minero en Mixico: 1900 -1952 (Mexico, 1983 , pp. 51-53. 34 Armando Rodriguez Suarez, "jNueva Rosita! Drama y Ejemplo de Hombres Dignos", in Mario" Gil! (ed.), La huelga de Nueva Rosita (Mexico, 1959) , pp. 67, 113. the virtues of business unionism. The USIS also printed and distributed pamphlets and donated fifty books to a new labor library in San Luis Potosf. 58 While successfully opening miners' locals to USIS propaganda, Reed proposed the formation of a Latin American miners' federation that would function under ORIT authority. Reed also instructed ORIT representatives to "root out"'communist and independent elements within the unions' locals, and he pledged funds for the campaigns of charro candidates in local union elections.
59
The strategy produced the desired results. American dollars helped to elect a substantial number of anticommunist union officials, some of whom had won posts at the national level. Soon after the 1953 elections, ORIT provided finances for all new charro leaders to visit other locals for the purpose of identifying and eliminating communists and independents. Cooperating with mining company management, the charros succeeded in obtaining the dismissals of about twenty-four active Communist Party members and the transfer of many militants, independents and communist sympathizers to places where they would be less influential among the rank and file.
60
Despite charro maneuvering, the independents and communists remained in many mining locals. In the states of Coahuila and Chihuahua, local leaders aligned with Lombardo and the CTAL attempted to counter ORIT dollars by offering the national union $1,500 in disaster relief for the families victimized by a disaster at the Dolores Mine in Michoacan during April 1954. They also invited the miners' union on a paid trip to the WFTU Congress in Vienna, and emphasized that there were no ideological commitments with the acceptance of the invitation.
61
With more funds at their disposal, ORIT neutralized the CTAL's maneuvering. Through its widely circulated Mexico City newspaper, Noticiario Obrero Interamericano, ORIT effectively portrayed anti-charro elements within the miners' union as Lombardistas and called them "communist agents" in the service of the Soviet Union. Complementing the ORIT propaganda offensive was Paul Reed's constant use of American dollars to entice the miners' leadership, which eventually led to the national union's flat rejection of the CTAL's invitation. Lombardo's political isolation also contributed to Reed's success. After supporting government wage freezes, no-strike pledges by unions, and using the power of the CTM's bureaucracy to stifle rank-and-file participation in the making of union policy, Lombardo had lost much credibility with the nation's workers. Cooperating with the US Embassy, Reed acted as a liaison for the awarding of grants and stipends for miners' leadership to visit the Charro success in "cleaning house" of rebels, independents and communists depended heavily upon financial assistance from ORTT. The money helped the CTM initiate new newspapers in areas of the republic where none had existed previously. Dollars from large American industrial unions also constructed a new CTM office building and headquarters that provided adequate space for ORTT and CTM activities. The new building was instrumental in the CTM's efforts in absorbing the smaller, struggling unions. Through ORIT money, many of these unions enjoyed logistical support and staff for the first time. The new labor center also gave the CTM visibility and a new legitimacy vis-a-vis other unions and federations that opposed state development policy. 70 Between 1954 and 1957, government officials and charro leaders put their extensive business union training into practice when they settled close to 40,000 labor disputes. Most of the contracts provided for minuscule wage increases and in some cases, like the railroad workers, unions settled for nothing. 71 And, although the number of "official" strikes declined during the same period and charro union leaders successfully employed the business unionism of their American counterparts, rank-andfile discontent continued. Workers continued to protest wage freezes, nostrike pledges and attempts to discipline them in the workplace. As workers' incomes stagnated and the distribution of wealth skewed upward, rank-and-file union members joined insurgent movements within the established trade unions and federations in opposition to charro leaders. Despite the financial backing of ORIT and American labor unions to charro leaders in teachers' state employees and communications workers' unions, many of whom had received Leader Grants and training in the United States, rank-and-file protest erupted in these organizations in 1958.
The insurgent movement among communication workers began on 6 February 1958, when 7,000 telegraph workers walked off the job in protest of the Secretary of Communications and Public Works (SCOP) violation of contract work rules. The secretary had transferred what he called thirtyseven "communist agitators", to posts outside Mexico City. Strikers called for a 50 per cent pay increase and defied government and charro demands for a return to work by cutting off the Federal District's internal telephone services. The strike gained momentum when nearly 500 international telephone operators struck, severing communications with dozens of countries. On 15 February 160 Radio Chapultepec employees and hundreds of telegraph workers who operated direct lines in banks and aviation companies began walking picket lines. As postal workers threatened to join their ranks, charros desperately sought a solution to the conflict. Working with the charro leadership of the Federation of State Workers' union, the Secretary of Communications revoked the transfer order and petitioned the government for a modest wage increase. The secretary's action infuriated the charro leadership. Instead of negotiating, the charros denounced the secretary's concession to "communist agitators" and insisted that no negotiations should take place until the strikers return to work. The strikers responded by sharply criticizing the union leadership for not representing genuine worker sentiment. The government, trying to avoid making martyrs of the strikers during an election year, timidly watched as charro leaders attempted to defuse the situation during a 16 February 1958 Mexico City meeting.
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Chairing the meeting was Federation of State Workers' Union General Secretary Abelardo de la Torre, a former Leader Grant recipient and prominent member of the Circulo Samuel Gompers. Workers shouted him down as he attempted to speak and offer them a meager 7 per cent wage increase. Strike leaders stood on chairs and denounced the unions' leadership as "traitors". The speakers repudiated the leadership's authority and declared that only they should represent the membership in negotiations with the government. As the walkout progressed, the strikers clandestinely received financial support from rank-and-file supporters of other unions. The expression of solidarity ultimately led to the formation of a new union, the Aliama. Immediately the press and the charro leadership orchestrated a propaganda campaign to discredit the Aliama by calling it an "unpatriotic" and "communistic" organization. The Cold War rhetoric eventually produced cracks in the Alianza's leadership, and pressure mounted for a negotiated settlement. The strikers finally accepted the original offer of a 7 per cent wage increase, but under the name of the newly-created Aliama, and not the charro-lzd union.
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While the real wages of all federal public employees had fallen 50 per cent between 1938 and 1952, teachers' salaries suffered a worse fate. Urban primary school teachers, especially the 15,582 of Mexico City, experienced acute inflationary pressures. 75 In 1956, after suffering attacks from charros and failing to win wage increases, rank-and-file members of the National Education Workers' union (SNTE) decided to organize an independent faction within the union much like the CTM depiiradas of the major industrial unions during the 1940s. Under the leadership of Othon Salazar, a former member of a Communist Youth organization, rank-and-file teachers formed the Comite de Lucha y Democratizacion. 73 Ibid. Kramer reported that Mexican government officials were concerned that forceful intervention in the strike might produce martyrs for the strikers, something the ruling party did not want during an election year. Based in the Federal District, the Comite de Lucha attempted to regain control of their local unions from the charro leaders. When the national union refused to conduct elections and called for the dissolution of the rank-and-file committee, the insurgents held their own convention. With over 15,000 Mexico City teachers in attendance, they elected Othon Salazar as general secretary. The committee asserted that the national union leadership had betrayed the Mexican Revolution and, accordingly, had changed its name in late 1957 to the Teachers' Revolutionary Movement (MRM). The teachers' actions generated a "propaganda" offensive by the National Teachers' union charros and Unity Bloc leader, Jesus Yuren, a Leader Grant recipient and Circulo Samuel Gompers member. Charro leaders received support from US officials working in Mexico who expressed concern about the growing discontent among Mexico's lower classes and the "communist influence" within trade unions.
76 Jesus Yuren and others accused Salazar and the Revolutionary Movement of being part of a "plan of an international character", bent on destroying national worker unity, and creating a climate of anarchy.
77 Despite the attacks, the strike continued and received support from parents, students and other unions, such as the electricians and railroad workers. The unity expressed by rank and filers prohibited the charros from recruiting strike-breakers, and thus forced the government to grant a substantial enough pay increase to end the strike.
CONCLUSION
The financial support given to the CTM by American unions and ORTT enhanced government control of the labor movement. It aided the state, through political linkages and violence, to keep in check militant and independent trade union activists during a crucial juncture in Mexican history. As the Mexican state moved ahead with its industrialization program in the following decades, and in the process increasingly accommodated foreign capital, the labor strategy designed in the early years of the Cold War remained a cornerstone of state development policy.
That policy began with Mexico's entry into World War n, when the state, the CTM and its collaborators sought to hold down wages and restrict the right to strike. Militant strikes and calls for the nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises highlighted rank-and-file resistance to these policies. As wartime state development policy continued after the conflict's end, opposition groups within the CTM joined new federations in an attempt to challenge its domination of the labor movement.
As this process unfolded, the Mexico's role in the post-war international division of labor, that of providing raw materials and inexpensive labor markets for more economically advanced countries like the United States, ultimately depended upon the state's open manipulation of trade union officials and the use of force against intransigent rank and file. In carrying out its development and labor policies, the Mexican state benefitted from the involvement of US trade unions, which exercised a crucial role by providing financial and logistical support and filling an ideological vacuum with the anticommunism of the Cold War. In the decades that followed, these factors solidified organized labor's leadership's support of a state development policy that increasingly favored capital, both foreign and domestic.
